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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
International mergers increasingly shape the industrial structure of de-
veloped and developing economies alike.1This is probably a natural de-
velopment. At some stage domestic economies of scale are exhausted.
In addition, economic integration means that not only trade but also
the market for corporate control is liberalised. The question remains,
though, if ﬁrms can have strategic reasons for choosing an international
rather than a national merger. The purpose of this paper is to apply
an international oligopoly model to analyse how the interplay between
t h el a b o u rm a r k e ta n dt h ep r o d u c tm a r k e tm a ya ﬀect ﬁrms’ merger deci-
sions. Could it be that ﬁrms merge internationally rather than nationally
to curb the market power of trade unions? If so, will we observe more
international mergers than what would be optimal seen from a welfare
point of view, or other types of mergers than the optimal ones?
To analyse such questions, a natural starting point would be the ex-
isting models on mergers and merger policy in open economies.2 How-
ever, most of the existing literature are about domestic mergers with
spillovers on foreign agents, and often focusing on the interplay between
merger policy and trade policy. In contrast, we focus on ﬁrms’ choice be-
tween a domestic and a cross-border merger.3 Horn and Persson (2001a)
suggest that cooperative game theory could be used to pinpoint which
industry structure will materialise when many diﬀerent mergers are pos-
sible.4 We apply this method to solve for the equilibrium market struc-
1Gugler et al. (2003) identify ﬁve great merger waves during the past century
and point out that the fraction of international mergers has steadily increased. As
reported in UNCTAD (2000, 2002), in 1999 the total value of worldwide cross-border
mergers and acquisitions amounted to more than 80 per cent of world FDI ﬂows. In
the same year, the share in all M&A that was cross-border, in value terms, reached
nearly 31 per cent. Furthermore, about 70 per cent of all cross-border M&As are hor-
izontal. In order to give an illustration of the increased importance of transnational
corporations, foreign aﬃliates accounted for about 54 million employees worldwide
in 2001, compared to 24 million in 1990.
2See, e.g., Dixit (1984), Barros and Cabral (1994), Long and Vousden (1995), Head
and Ries (1997), Sørgard (1997), Richardson (1999), Horn and Levinsohn (2001),
Collie (2003) and Neary (2003a, 2003b).
3Some papers study how ﬁrms in one country may access the market in some
other country. Cross-border mergers are studied as one alternative way of access,
with greenﬁeld investment and exports as alternatives. See Norbäck and Persson
(2003), Bjorvatn (2003) and Bertrand (2003).
4An alternative route is to model acqusitions, where ﬁrms behave non-
cooperatively in a bidding game. See Kamien and Zang (1990) for such a model.
Theories of sequential mergers, as in Nilssen and Sørgard (1998), also picture merg-
ers as alternatives to each other. A merger at a given point in time can be proﬁtable
simply because it prevents some other merger at a later stage. These are, however,
not models of endogenous mergers, as the merger candidates and the time sequence
2ture when we allow for two-ﬁrm mergers in a situation with four ﬁrms
initially.5
The novel feature of the present work is the focus on the interaction
between market power in the product market and in the labour market.
Already Brander and Spencer (1988), Davidson (1988), Dowrick (1989)
and De Fraja (1993) suggested that oligopoly power in the product mar-
ket might be an important reason why trade unions have the potential
to inﬂuence wage setting.6 Empirical studies suggest that mergers in the
product market - which leads to higher concentration - may in fact inﬂu-
ence wages. But the picture is mixed. Some studies ﬁnd that a merger
leads to higher wages, while others ﬁn dt h eo p p o s i t er e s u l to rn oe ﬀect at
all.7 Unfortunately, there are few theoretical studies that can guide us
on how mergers are expected to aﬀect wages. The present paper helps
to ﬁll this gap, by showing how diﬀerent types of mergers have distinctly
diﬀerent eﬀect on wages and in turn on proﬁts and welfare.
A core idea in the present paper is that an international merger
can tilt the power balance between employers and workers. We study
an international Cournot oligopoly with two domestic and two foreign
ﬁrms, where wages are set by monopoly trade unions. The analysis rests
further on the assumption that it is easier for workers to organise within,
as opposed to across, national borders.8 This notion is most conveniently
implemented by letting trade unions be national by assumption: any
ﬁrm operating in a given economy meets the wage claims of the relevant
national union. As long as there are national unions - or at least that
unions within a nation cooperate more easily than unions in diﬀerent
of possible mergers are exogenously assumed.
5Horn and Persson (2001b) apply their own method to an international oligopoly
situation. They show how reduced trade costs inﬂuence merger patterns in an in-
ternational oligopoly. More precisely, they suggest that lower trade costs tend to
favour international mergers. As will become apparent, this is rather far removed
from the points that are highlighted in the present paper. Lommerud et al. (2003a),
Straume (2003), Huck and Konrad (2003), Saggi and Yildiz (2002) and Yildiz (2002)
also follow the endogenous merger track in international settings.
6For more recent work on unionised oligopoly, see Naylor (1998), Munch and
Skaksen (2002), Lommerud et al. (2003b) and Pﬂügler (2003). See also Neary (2002).
7Brown and Medoﬀ (1988), Cremieux et al. (1996) and Peoples et al. (1993) ﬁnd
support for a wage cut following a merger, while McGuckin and Nguyen (2001) ﬁnd
the opposite result. Hekmat (1995) ﬁnds no evidence of any link between mergers
and wages, while Gokhale et al. (1995) ﬁnd no or only a limited evidence of a link
between takeovers and wages. Finally, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) ﬁnd that mergers
have no eﬀect on employment in the US while it leads to lower employment in Europe,
which might have to do with the degree of pre-merger wage ﬂexibility.
8Formal union cooperation across national borders is indeed very rarely observed.
In addition to historical, institutional and cultural explanations, this is probably also
explained by the relatively high degree of cross-border immobility of labour.
3countries - then an international merger, as opposed to a national one,
will imply that the merged ﬁrm meets two uncoordinated unions.
Since we model market power both in the input (labour) and output
market, a merger will change both output prices and wages. We ﬁnd
that a national merger leads to higher wages. Market shares are less
sensitive to wage changes after a merger, and the union exploits this
by raising wages. More interestingly, the wage increase is higher for
the non-merging than for the merging ﬁrm. The driving force is the
reshuﬄing of sales following a merger. Lower production by the merged
ﬁrm and higher production by the non-merging ﬁrms encourages the
union serving the non-merging ﬁrm to increase its wage more than what
is optimal for the union serving the merging ﬁrm. Consequently, there
is a raising rivals’ cost eﬀect of a national merger.
We ﬁnd that an international merger has a distinctly diﬀerent eﬀect
on the unions’ wage setting. An international merger would imply that
the merged ﬁrm is served by two diﬀerent unions, each producing input
to one of the merged ﬁrm’s two products. Then the merged ﬁrm can
partly replace sales of one of its products by increasing the sales of the
other product. Since an international merger leads to such a ﬂexibility, it
triggers competition between the unions. As a result, the unions compete
more ﬁercely and they set a lower wage.9
Since a national merger has a raising rivals’ cost eﬀect while an in-
ternational merger leads to lower wages for all ﬁrms, it is ap r i o r inot
clear what would be the equilibrium market structure. It turns out that,
if there exists a stable equilibrium market structure, it involves either
one or two international mergers. Firms merge internationally to trig-
ger a reduction in wages, even though this wage reduction beneﬁts the
outsiders as well. We show that when the products are close substitutes
there is only one international merger taking place. In such a case the
wage reduction following a ﬁrst international merger is substantial, and
leaves only limited potential for a further wage reduction. Then a sec-
ond international merger would be dominated by the disadvantageous
output response from the outside ﬁrm, the traditional eﬀect that make
mergers unproﬁtable in Cournot markets.
While ﬁrms prefer to merge internationally, it is not obvious that
this is the correct choice from a global or domestic welfare point of view.
A wage reduction is a transfer from workers to employers that does not
increase social welfare, all else equal. However, lower wages may in
turn lead to lower product prices. If so, consumers beneﬁt as well. We
9This could be called a ”second source” argument, even though this is not second
sourcing in a literal sense. The paper in the second source literature that is closest
to our model (but still quite diﬀerent) is Choi and Davidson (2003).
4ﬁnd that from a global welfare perspective one international merger is
preferred if products are not very diﬀerentiated, and otherwise no merger
is preferred. It follows that unless products are close substitutes there are
more mergers than what is socially preferred. One international merger
can be beneﬁcial for society, because the ﬁrst international merger has
as u b s t a n t i a ld o w n w a r de ﬀect on wages, which in turn may be large
enough to lower product prices as well. However, a second international
merger will always have a more limited wage eﬀect, and thus never lead
to any beneﬁts for consumers.
Many would argue that the aim of competition authorities is not to
maximise global social welfare, but rather the domestic social welfare
of one’s own country. If a suﬃciently small share of the consumers
live in the domestic economy, the most preferred market structure is a
foreign national merger, not one or two international ones. This would
harm consumers, but beneﬁtd o m e s t i cﬁrms and workers through higher
wages, employment and proﬁts. We also ﬁnd that with rent-maximising
unions, a domestic merger is always detrimental to domestic welfare.
This goes against any idea that lax merger policy domestically, to build
up a national champion, would be a good substitute for strategic trade
policy.
In an extension to our model we further posit that mergers may also
imply additional exogenous cost synergies, e.g., through rationalisation
of operations that increases the productivity of labour, and that this
eﬀect is larger for national than for international mergers. Would ﬁrms
still prefer international mergers even if they are cost-ineﬃcient? In
this part of the paper we ﬁnd that if the synergy eﬀect from a national
merger is suﬃciently strong and products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated,
one domestic and one foreign national merger is indeed the equilibrium
market structure. We also investigate which type of mergers a union
would prefer. The interest of the union is not necessarily well aligned
with that of the ﬁrm. Perhaps the most interesting observation is the
identiﬁcation of situations where the ﬁrms want national mergers to reap
the beneﬁts of localised synergies, whereas the unions fear the job losses
that is accompanied by the increase in labour productivity. Instead, the
unions would prefer international mergers, even though this implies that
their power partly is curbed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
present the structural model and explain the merger formation process.
The union wage eﬀects of merger - the crucial feature of the model - are
analysed and discussed in Section 3. The proﬁtability of a single two-
ﬁrm merger is brieﬂy discussed in Section 4, followed by a presentation of
the equilibrium market structure in Section 5. Implications for welfare -
5global and domestic - are discussed in Sections 6 and 7. In an extension
of the model, the eﬀects and implications of exogenous merger synergies
in national mergers are discussed in Section 8, whereas, ﬁnally, some
concluding remarks are oﬀered in Section 9.
2 The model
Four ex ante identical ﬁrms (owners) are located in two countries, A and
B. Owners 1 and 2 are located in country A, whereas owners 3 and 4
reside in country B. Ownership is connected (e.g. through patents) to the
production of a speciﬁcb r a n do fad i ﬀerentiated product. Each brand
is produced with labour as the only variable factor of production,10 and
ﬁrms compete in Cournot fashion in a single integrated market.
The market clearing price of brand i is given by the following inverse
demand function:
pi =1− qi − b
X
j
qj,i , j =1 ,..,4,i 6= j, (1)
where qi is produced quantity of brand i,a n db ∈ (0,1) represents the
degree of product diﬀerentiation.11 Following Singh and Vives (1984),
this demand structure is derived from the maximisation problem of a




















,i , j =1 ,..,4,i 6= j. (2)
The production technologies are described by the following simple
production function for brand i:
qi = aini, (3)
where ni is the amount of labour employed in the production of brand i
and ai ≥ 1 is a measure of labour productivity.
Workers are organised in trade unions. A key assumption of the
model is that workers are not able to organise across borders, nor are
trade unions in diﬀerent countries able credibly to coordinate their wage
10This means that we abstract from all questions about how unionised wage set-
ting inﬂuences the use of capital. For example, Staiger (1988) and Agell and Lom-
merud (1993) have emphasised that the capital movements that are set in motion by
unionised wage setting need not be detrimental to unionised workers or the economies
in which they operate, even in an open economy perspective.
11Lommerud and Sørgard (1997) use a similar demand system, but assume that
there are ﬁxed costs associated with establishing brands and that the number of
brands is an endogenously determined choice variable.
6demands.12 We thus make the assumption that workers are organised in
country-speciﬁc industry-wide unions.
We adopt the monopoly union model, where wages in each country
are unilaterally set by the respective trade unions. Union preferences
are characterised by the following Stone-Geary utility functions for the
trade unions in countries A and B, respectively:
VA =( wA − w)
θ (n1 + n2)
1−θ , (4)
VB =( wB − w)
θ (n3 + n4)
1−θ , (5)
where wA (wB) is the wage set by the union in country A(B), w<1
is the outside wage (that can be earned outside the oligopoly industry),
assumed to be equal in both countries, and θ ∈ (0,1) represents the
relative importance of wages and employment to the unions.
This particular speciﬁcation of union utility, where wages in each
country are industry-speciﬁcr a t h e rt h a np l a n t - s p e c i ﬁc, is most appro-
priate when workers in a certain industry are organised by the same
industry-wide union and wage determination takes place at industry
level. This corresponds well with the bargaining institutions in many
European countries, where trade unions bargain for uniform wage in-
creases across all ﬁrms at industry- or sectorial level.
Alternatively, an industry-wide union could target each ﬁrm in the
industry separately, with the possibility of diﬀerent wage settlements at
diﬀerent ﬁrms. Allowing for diﬀerent wages at diﬀerent plants within the
same country would modify some of our results, but the main message of
the paper does not qualitatively depend on this assumption. A further
discussion of the importance of this assumption is presented in Appendix
B.
Proﬁts associated with the sale of each particular brand are given by
πi = piqi − wAni,i =1 ,2, (6)
πj = pjqj − wBnj,j =3 ,4. (7)
The game is characterised by the following sequence of moves:
• Stage 1: The equilibrium ownership structure of the industry is
determined through bargaining between the owners.
• Stage 2: The trade unions simultaneously and independently set
wages.
• Stage 3: The ﬁrms simultaneously and independently set quanti-
ties.
12A model that studies possible collusion among trade unions can be found in
Straume (2002).
72.1 Merger formation
The ownership structure of the industry is assumed to be formed through
a cooperative game of coalition-formation. We make the assumption that
only two-ﬁrm mergers are allowed.13 Each production plant continues
t oe x i s ta f t e ram e r g e r ,a n di ti sn o tp o s s i b l et om o v et h ep r o d u c t i o no f
one brand from one plant to another, so the quintessence of a merger is
coordination on output decisions among the participating units. With
two-ﬁrm mergers, we are left with 6 possible market structures, com-
prising a combined total of 10 possible ownership structures, that could
emerge as an equilibrium outcome. Labelling country A as the ‘domes-
tic’ country, we introduce the following notation to distinguish between
the diﬀerent market structures:
1. No merger: M0 = {1,2,3,4}
2. One national domestic merger: Md
N = {12,3,4}
3. One national foreign merger: M
f
N = {1,2,34}
4. Two national mergers: M2N = {12,34}
5. One international merger: MI = {13,2,4}, M0




6. Two international mergers: M2I = {13,24}, M0
2I = {14,23}
The solution procedure is based on Horn and Persson (2001a), who
treat the merger process as a cooperative game of coalition-formation,
where the players are free to communicate and write binding contracts.
Owners that agree on a merger can decide on any division of the ﬁrm’s
proﬁts, but payments between coalitions are not allowed. The approach
then involves a comparison of any two possible ownership structures Mi
and Mj,w h e r eMi is said to dominate Mj if the combined proﬁts of
the decisive group of owners are larger in Mi than in Mj.T h edecisive
group of owners are the owners that are expected to be able to inﬂuence
whether Mi will be formed instead of Mj, and vice versa. Given the
above assumptions, owners belonging to identical coalitions in the two
structures cannot aﬀect whether Mj will be formed instead of Mi,b u t
all remaining owners can inﬂuence this choice and are thus decisive.14
13It is straightforward but space-consuming to extend the model to allow for merg-
ers that include three production units. Three-ﬁrm mergers are more likely to be
blocked by competition authorites, and the present focus on two-ﬁrm mergers also
makes the distinction between national and international merger more succint.
14See Horn and Persson (2001a) for a formal deﬁnition of decisive owners.
8To give a brief illustration of the main ideas in the model, consider a
comparison between the no-merger structure (M0)a n dt h em a r k e ts t r u c -
ture with one domestic merger (Md
N). In this case owners 3 and 4 stand
alone in both structures, so the decisive owners are the merger partici-
pants in Md
N, i.e. owners 1 and 2, and dominance relation is determined
b yw h e t h e ro rn o tt h em e r g e ri sp r o ﬁtable for the participants. Now
consider instead a comparison between a domestic and an international
merger, say between Md
N and MI.F o r Md
N to dominate MI it is not
enough that (the domestic) owners 1 and 2 prefer Md
N over MI.I fo w n e r
3 is adversely aﬀected by the formation of Md
N,t h i so w n e rm a yw a n t
to persuade owner 1 to form MI instead, by oﬀering a large share of
the surplus in this structure. Thus, three owners (1,2 and 3) are deci-
sive, and the dominance relation is determined by a comparison of total
proﬁts for these three owners in the two ownership structures.
Finally, the solution concept is the core. Those structures that are
in the core - i.e., the structures that are undominated -a r ed e ﬁned as
Equilibrium Ownership Structures (EOS) ,w h i c ht h e nd e t e r m i n et h e
Equilibrium Market Structure (EMS).
3 Market structures and union wages
The outcome of the bargaining game between the owners are highly
dependent on the anticipated union wage responses. Assume for the time
being that production technologies are identical. For simplicity, we set
ai =1 . We denote the equilibrium ‘domestic’ wage in market structure
Mi by wA (Mi). By a comparison of equilibrium wage expressions for
diﬀerent market structures (see appendix A) we derive the following
result:












(ii) wA (M0) >w A (MI) >w A (M2I)
We see that there exists an unambiguous ranking of market structures
with respect to union wages. Furthermore, using the no-merger structure
as a benchmark, a clear pattern arises: union wages are higher in any
market structure involving national merger(s) only, whereas the opposite
is true in market structures involving international merger(s).15
15These results are related to Lommerud et al. (2003a), who discuss how down-
stream mergers might inﬂuence the prices charged by upstream ﬁrms with market
power. A trade union can be seen as such an ‘upstream input supplier’. In that
paper we point out that the main results, broadly speaking, carries over to models
with wage bargaining (rather than wage setting) and/or Bertrand competition. Even
though there are diﬀerences between the models - the present one being made specif-
9The intuition behind these results can be found through a more care-
ful scrutiny of the unions’ maximisation problem. The ﬁrst-order condi-










where ηA is the wage elasticity of the total demand for workers in country
A, and given by
ηA = −
∂ [n1 (wA,w B)+n2 (wA,w B)]
∂wA
wA
n1 (wA,w B)+n2 (wA,w B)
. (9)
Obviously, the ﬁrst-order condition for wage setting in country B is com-
pletely equivalent.
>From (8) it is apparent that diﬀe r e n tm a r k e ts t r u c t u r e sy i e l dd i f -
ferent union wages insofar as labour demand elasticities at a given wage
level are diﬀerent. More speciﬁcally, we have the standard negative re-
lationship between ηA and wA. In general, a merger will alter both the
demand for labour at the pre-merger wage and t h ew a g es e n s i t i v i t yo f
labour demand, and, as a result, wages will also change.
Consider ﬁrst a national merger. Such a merger will reduce the degree
of product market competition and thus cause labour demand to be
less wage sensitive, since the equilibrium market shares of ﬁrms are less
responsive to wage changes.16 This implies that labour demand gets less
elastic, which results in higher wages. Naturally, this eﬀect is stronger
in the market structure with two national mergers. In the case of just
one national merger, Proposition 1 conﬁr m st h a tw a g e sa r el o w e ri nt h e
country of the merger participants. This is due to the eﬀect of the merger
on labour demand for the merging and non-merging ﬁrms, respectively.
At the pre-merger wages, the merged ﬁrm has an incentive to cut back
on production, which implies a reduction of labour demand. The outside
ﬁrms - being free-riders on the merger - have opposite incentives. This
implies - as can be deduced from (9) - that labour demand is more elastic
for the merged ﬁrm. Consequently, there is a raising rivals’ costs eﬀect
of a national merger in this case.
Now consider an international merger. The crucial feature of such
a merger is that the merged ﬁrm is able to scale up production at one
ically to portray an international oligopoly - the main mechanisms of the models are
similar, so we expect this to be true also in this framwork. Our earlier paper has no
mention of welfare analysis, which is of central interest here.
16It is straightforward to derive this eﬀect from the labour demand functions, which
are suppressed from the analytical exposition due to space limitations. This eﬀect
of reduced product market competition on the wage sensitivity of labour demand is
also identiﬁed by Dowrick (1989).
10plant and down at the other, and the two plants involved rely on labour
supply from diﬀerent trade unions. This means that labour demand from
each plant of the merged ﬁrm gets more responsive to wage diﬀerentials
between the two trade unions, and thus more elastic. The strength
of this eﬀect depends on the substitutability of products in demand.
The less diﬀerentiated the products are, the more intense is the merger-
induced competition between the trade unions. In fact, if products are
homogeneous all union rents will be competed away.17 However, as long
as the products are not perfect substitutes, wages will be even lower in
the case of two international merger than with one. The intuition is
quite straightforward: when only two of the ﬁrms merge internationally,
the trade unions have weaker incentives to engage in wage undercutting,
since labour demand from the non-merged ﬁrms are less responsive to
wage diﬀerentials.
We can study the wage eﬀects of mergers in more detail by look-
ing at the comparative statics eﬀects of changes in the parameters b
and θ. Since the qualitatively important distinction is between national
and international mergers, and not the number of such mergers, we will
consider symmetrical market structures only, i.e. M0, M2N and M2I.
Deﬁning ∆N := wi (M2N) − wi (M0) and ∆I := wi (M0) − wi (M2I) we




θb(1 − w)(1− θ)(4+3b − 4θb)
(1 + b − θb)
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2b − 6θb +3 b − 4θ + θ
2b2 − 2θb2 + b2
´
(1 − w)b2
(1 + b − θb)






4+4 b − 8θ − 8θb − θ
2b2 − 2θb2 + b2 +1 0 θ
2b
´
(1 − w)b(2 + b)
(2 + b − 2θb)
2 (2 + b − 3θb)
2 .
(13)
It is easily conﬁrmed that
∂∆N
∂b > 0 and
∂∆I
∂b > 0,s ot h ee ﬀect of product
diﬀerentiation is unambiguous: less diﬀerentiated products will always
increase the wage response to a merger. This illustrates the importance
of the intensity of product market competition in explaining unions’ wage
responses to corporate mergers. For the case of international mergers, we
have already explained the role of product diﬀerentiation, which deter-
mines the degree of post-merger inter-union competition. For the case of
17>From (A.15) and (A.19) in the appendix it is easily conﬁrmed that b =1yields
wi = w, i = A,B,i fﬁrms merge internationally.
11national mergers, on the other hand, the wage response is due to reduced
product market competition, which makes labour demand less wage sen-
sitive. Naturally, this eﬀect - reduced product market competition - is
stronger when products are closer substitutes in demand.
The eﬀect of changes in the union preference parameter, θ, is gener-
ally ambiguous. From (12) and (13) we can easily derive that
∂∆N
∂θ
> (<)0 if θ < (>)
6b +4+2 b2 − 2
√





> (<)0 if θ < (>)
(2 + b)
³
4+2 b − 2
√




which establishes a hump-shaped relationship between θ and post-merger
wage responses. This is quite intuitive: a merger leads to wage changes
to the extent that the merger alters the marginal trade-oﬀ between wages
and employment at the pre-merger wage. This trade-oﬀ is of importance
when both wages and employment matters for the unions, which is es-
pecially the case for medium values of θ.
4M e r g e r p r o ﬁtability
Before we solve for the equilibrium of the endogenous merger game, it is
instructive to consider under which circumstances a merger is proﬁtable.
With exogenous (and linear) production costs we know that a certain
degree of product diﬀerentiation is necessary in order to make a two-ﬁrm
merger in Cournot oligopoly proﬁtable (see, e.g., Deneckere and David-
son, 1985, and Lommerud and Sørgard, 1997). In a Cournot model, a
merger without cost savings will lead the merging parties to contract
their output, while outsiders expand. The more diﬀerentiated products
are, the less the merged unit loses market share to outsiders, and for
suﬃcient diﬀerentiation a merger is proﬁtable even in the Cournot case.
However, when wages are endogenous, the proﬁtability of a merger also
depends on union preferences. Using the no-merger equilibrium as a
point of comparison, the proﬁtability of a single two-ﬁrm merger is il-
lustrated in Figure 1.
I ft h ed e g r e eo fp r o d u c td i ﬀerentiation is suﬃciently high, both a na-
tional and an international merger is proﬁtable (Area A). On the other
hand, if products are closer substitutes, a national merger is not prof-
itable. In this case only an international merger is proﬁtable, provided
that unions put a suﬃciently strong emphasis on wages (Area B). This










Figure 1: Merger proﬁtability
strong enough, a merger will be proﬁtable. However, if products are
close substitutes and unions are highly employment oriented, then the
aggressive responses from the outside ﬁrms outweigh the wage reduction
in an international merger, implying that no merger is proﬁtable (Area
C). It is important to note that unions that care very much for employ-
m e n tw i l ls e taw a g en o tt o od i ﬀerent from the competitive wage level
in any case. In such cases, the wage-reducing eﬀect of an international
merger is limited. The resulting outcome is similar to what obtains with
exogenously given wages. Note also that the result in Salant et.al. (1983)
is the speciﬁc point South East in the ﬁgure where b =1and θ =0 .
5 The equilibrium market structure
Under the assumption of identical technologies, the outside wage plays
n oi m p o r t a n tr o l e .T h ee q u i l i b r i u mo u t c o m eo ft h em e r g e rg a m ed e p e n d s
on union preferences (θ)a n dt h ed e g r e eo fp r o d u c td i ﬀerentiation (b).
In order to facilitate comparison with the subsequent welfare analysis,
we will ﬁrst consider the special case of rent-maximising unions, which
implies θ = 1
2. A comparison of the relevant proﬁt expressions along the
line of the solution procedure sketched in Section 2.1 yields the following
result:
Proposition 2 With rent-maximising trade unions, the equilibrium mar-
ket structure is two international mergers if b ≤ 0.92 and one interna-
tional merger if b>0.92.
The equilibrium market structure with rent-maximising unions al-
ways implies that at least two ﬁrms engage in an international merger.
Due to the eﬀect on union wages, two international mergers yields higher










Figure 2: Equilibrium market structure
any market structure involving national merger(s). However, if b is suf-
ﬁciently high M2I is dominated by MI. In other words, given that two
of the ﬁrms merge internationally, a merger between the remaining two
owners is not proﬁtable if products are suﬃciently close substitutes. A
large part of the potential wage reduction is exhausted after the ﬁrst
merger, and the main eﬀect of a second merger is to trigger a disadvan-
tageous response from the outsider.
For the general case, with Stone-Geary utility functions and for any
value of θ, an analytical characterisation of the equilibrium is infeasible.
Instead, the solution is graphically illustrated in Figure 2, which is con-
structed from plots of the relevant proﬁtc o m p a r i s o n si nt h e(b,θ) plane.
The equilibrium market structure, if it exists, still always implies that at
least two of the ﬁrms merge internationally. However, the combination
of highly employment oriented unions (low θ) and products being close
substitutes (high b) leads to a situation where no equilibrium ownership
structure exists. If unions are relatively employment oriented a single
international merger is not proﬁtable, because the wage-reducing eﬀect
i sn o ts t r o n ge n o u g h( c f . F i g u r e1 ) . A tt h es a m et i m ew ek n o w ,f r o m
t h ea r g u m e n ta b o v e ,t h a tf o rh i g hv a l u e so fb two international mergers
are not an equilibrium structure either, since such a market structure is
dominated by one international merger. Furthermore, a no-merger struc-
ture is dominated by two international mergers. Thus, if the degree of
product diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently low and unions are suﬃciently em-
ployment oriented, any ownership structure is dominated by at least one
other structure and no equilibrium exists.
146G l o b a l w e l f a r e
In regard to social welfare the analysis of the previous section immedi-
ately raises the following question: will the ‘merger market forces’ lead
to socially desirable market structures? The answer to this question is
obviously important in determining the optimal framing of merger policy
in open economies, and in this section we will highlight the implications
for global welfare - deﬁned as the sum of consumers’ surplus, proﬁts
and union utility - by making a social ranking of market structures. In
order to make consistent welfare comparisons, we use a monetary mea-
sure of union utility. More precisely, we consider the special case of













Note that the welfare function weighs incomes of diﬀerent groups
in society equally. Wage payments and payments for goods therefore
appear as mere transfers of money that do not inﬂuence social welfare.
In consequence, welfare is decided solely by the value to consumers of the
goods produced less the opportunity cost of the labour resource used as
input. A straightforward comparison of welfare (using the equilibrium
expressions reported in the appendix, with θ = 1
2) yields the following
social ranking of market structures:
Proposition 3 (i) M0 Â MN Â M2N for all b
(ii) MI Â M2I for all b
(iii) MI Â M0 if b>0.40
(iv) M2I Â M0 if b>1
2
The socially most preferred market structure, from a viewpoint of
global welfare, is one international merger if the degree of product dif-
ferentiation is suﬃciently low. Otherwise, no merger is preferred. Com-
paring Propositions 2 and 3, we see that the merger process actually
produces the socially most preferred ownership structure if products are
very close substitutes. However, for a wide parameter space what society
wants is one international merger but what it gets is two such mergers.
The reason why mergers can be socially optimal here while they
would not be in a model with exogenous wages, is that the power struggle
between labour and capital not only lower wages, but consumer prices
15may fall as a result. Since national mergers have no such eﬀect on wages,
rather the opposite, they will never be socially optimal. International
mergers, though, have the desired eﬀect on wages. As the model is
speciﬁed, one international merger brings wages and prices down in a
socially preferred way. Yet another international merger will lower wages
even more. However, the wage eﬀect of the second merger is typically
more limited than the ﬁrst one. In addition, the lack of competition in
the output market becomes so acute that the consumers lose out relative
to the situation with only one international merger.
It can be diﬃcult to enforce a competition policy that allows one
international merger but not two, since these mergers supposedly are
announced at the same time and completely symmetric. Would a no-
merger policy be better than a policy that allows any international two-
ﬁrm merger? Allowing any international merger improves global welfare
if b>1
2, as is apparent from Proposition 3. The intuition is relatively
straightforward: for mergers to improve welfare they must lead to re-
duced consumer prices, at least for some brands. Such price reduc-
tions can only occur if wages are suﬃciently reduced as a result of the
merger(s). From Proposition 1 we know that only cross-border mergers
lead to lower wages, and the lower the degree of product diﬀerentiation,
the higher the wage reduction due to an international merger.
7 Domestic welfare
The evaluation of diﬀerent market structures from a perspective of do-
mestic welfare may diﬀer signiﬁcantly from evaluations with respect to
global welfare.18 In order to analyse the impact of mergers on domestic
welfare we make a couple of additional assumptions. First, we assume
that domestic consumers’ surplus constitutes a fraction α ∈ (0,1) of total
consumers’ surplus. Second, we assume that proﬁts are divided evenly
between the owners taking part in a merger. Due to the symmetry of
the model, domestic welfare is given by
W




















[(1 − α)pi − w]qi. (17)
18Konrad and Lommerud (2001) warn that any preferential treatment of domestic
ﬁrms can be manipulated in the following sense: foreign owners may sell their assets
to domestic owners who then receive favourable treatment, but this only makes the
domestic buyers willing to pay a higher price for the assets in question, so the real









Figure 3: Domestically most preferred ownership structure
Figure 3 depicts the pattern of the most preferred market structure
in the (b,α) plane.
By comparing Figure 3 and Proposition 3 we see that there is no con-
ﬂict between domestic and global interests, from a welfare point of view,
as long as a suﬃciently high share of consumers reside in the domestic
country. The outcome is then one international merger for b above 0.4,
and no merger otherwise, precisely as a concern for global welfare would
dictate. However, if α is suﬃciently low the domestically most preferred
market structure is a foreign national merger, which harms consumers,
but beneﬁts domestic ﬁrms and workers through higher wages, employ-
ment and proﬁts.
Figure 3 illustrates a potential conﬂict, though, when it comes to co-
ordination of domestic antitrust policies across diﬀerent countries. As-
sume that a large share of the consumers, say α =0 .8,r e s i d ei nc o u n t r y
A. In this case, the most preferred market structure for Country A is
one international merger if products are not too diﬀerentiated, and no
merger otherwise. However, if 80 per cent of consumers live in country
A then at most 20 per cent of consumers in this market live in country
B ,a n dt h i sc o u n t r yw o u l dc o n s e q u e n t l yp r e f e raf o r e i g nn a t i o n a lm e r g e r .
From Figure 3 it can be seen that the two countries have corresponding
interests only if (close to) all consumers in the market reside in either of
the two countries and the division of consumers is (close to) 50/50.
Although the domestic welfare ranking of market structures is highly
dependent on the importance of domestic consumers’ surplus, we are
able to derive an unambiguous, and perhaps surprising, result regard-
ing the eﬀect of national mergers on domestic welfare. Let Wd (Mi)
denote domestic welfare in market structure Mi. Using the equilibrium
expressions presented in the appendix, with θ = 1
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17of the following result:
Proposition 4 With rent-maximising unions, a domestic merger is al-
ways detrimental to domestic welfare.
The Proposition implies that if national competition policy is gov-
erned by considerations for domestic welfare, as deﬁned by (16), the
antitrust authorities should never allow a domestic merger. This holds
even if α =0 , which means that the proposed merger’s eﬀect on con-
sumers’ surplus is irrelevant for domestic welfare. Thus, even if a do-
mestic merger is proﬁtable, the decrease in domestic union rents, due to
a loss of employment, more than outweighs the increase in proﬁts.
This result mirrors the result found in Brander and Spencer (1985).
They found that a government should pay a subsidy to a domestic ﬁrm
operating in a foreign Cournot market. The subsidy is a commitment
device which helps the ﬁrm to behave more aggressively and shift proﬁts
to its own country. In our setting we found that a national merger
resulted in higher wages, which is the opposite of paying a subsidy to the
ﬁrm. This implies that the Cournot ﬁrm operating in a foreign market
is committed to act less aggressively when it faces higher wages after the
merger, thereby reducing the combined sum of proﬁts and union rent.
This result contrasts with any idea that lax domestic merger policy can
substitute for strategic trade policy or other activist industrial policies
to build up national champions.
8 National merger synergies
T h ep r e v i o u sa n a l y s i sw a sb a dn e w sf o ra n y o n ew a n t i n gt oa r g u et h a t
merger policy should be steered towards domestic rather than interna-
tional mergers, even though the analysis also revealed that equilibrium
outcomes only seldom coincide with welfare optimality (be it global or
domestic welfare). We here extend the analysis to the case where merger
synergies are larger when the merger is national than when it is inter-
national. True or not, we want to investigate if this assumption leads to
more national mergers. We also think it has some intuitive appeal that
mergers of units that are located geographically closer together also are
t h eo n e st h a tc a nb r i n ga b o u tt h el a r g e rc o s ts a v i n g s .M o r e o v e r ,u n i o n s
sometimes approve of international mergers and not of domestic ones.
An anecdotal example is the Norwegian ﬁnancial industry, where it seems
to be a rule almost without exception that unions prefer international
mergers. This seems hard to reconcile with a theory that predicts that
international mergers undermine the bargaining power of labour. Can
national merger synergies explain why unions sometimes prefer interna-
18tional mergers in spite of the fact that their power in wage setting is
reduced?19 20
We model national merger synergies as an increase in labour produc-
tivity. Speciﬁcally, for any market structure, let owners participating in
n a t i o n a lm e r g e r sb ed e n o t e db yt h ei n d e xi, whereas owners participat-
ing in international mergers or standing alone are denoted by the index
j. We then assume that ai = a>1 and aj =1 .
How does increased labour productivity aﬀect wages, proﬁts and
union utility? Consider the market structure with two national mergers.
Using the equilibrium expressions reported in the appendix we can easily
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An exogenous increase in labour productivity causes unions to in-
crease their wage demands, so part of the productivity gain is oﬀset by
higher wages. Nevertheless, for any positive outside wage the ﬁrms al-
ways beneﬁt from increased labour productivity. The eﬀect on union
utility, on the other hand, is ambiguous.21 Increased labour produc-
tivity implies that higher wages is traded for a loss of employment, so
whether or not the unions are better oﬀ depends on how this trade-oﬀ
is evaluated. From (20) we ﬁnd that
∂Vi
∂a




19Spillovers from a merged unit to other ﬁrms that are stronger from a domestic
merger than an international one, would also make domestic authorities more prone
to prefer a national solution. A recent contribution on the international competition
for investment with spillovers is Olsen and Osmundsen (2003). Keller (2002) and
Maurseth and Verspagen (2003) contain evidence that geographical proximity is pos-
itive for technological spillovers, which tallies broadly with the notion that national
mergers have larger synergy eﬀects than international ones.
20Arguably, the economic theory of merger has focussed too little on the eﬀect of
mergers on internal organisation. Huck, Konrad and Müller (2003) is a ﬁrst step in
this direction.
21For a related discussion, see Dowrick and Spencer (1994).
19Thus, an increase in labour productivity increases union utility if the
unions are suﬃciently wage oriented. Equivalently, unions prefer to be
less productive if the fear of job loss is great enough.22
Without any exogenous synergies, the previous analysis showed that
if the ﬁrms merge, they always merge internationally. However, if the ex-
ogenous synergies associated with national merger are suﬃciently strong,
ﬁrms may instead want to merge nationally. Consider M2N,w h e r ea l l
ﬁrms merge nationally, as a candidate equilibrium market structure. A
necessary (but not suﬃcient) condition for this market structure to be
an equilibrium is that it dominates the structure where all ﬁrms merge
internationally, M2I. The dominance relation in this case is determined
by a comparison of total industry proﬁts in the two market structures.
Using (A.14) and (A.22) in the appendix it follows that
M2N dom M2I if a > a =
w(1 + b)(2+b − 3θb)
w(2 + b)(1+b − θb) − θb(1 + 2b)
(22)




(1 + b)(2+b − 3θb)θb(1 + 2b)
[w(2 + b)(1+b − θb) − θb(1 + 2b)]




bw(1 + 2b)(2+b)(1+b)(1− w)
[w(2 + b)(1+b − θb) − θb(1 + 2b)]




wθ(1 − w)(2− 3θb2 +5 b2 +8 b)
[w(2 + b)(1+b − θb) − θb(1 + 2b)]
2 > 0 (25)
W es e et h a tt h es y n e r g ye ﬀect necessary to induce ﬁrms to merge
nationally rather than internationally, is larger the more wage oriented
the unions, and the less diﬀerentiated the products. Less diﬀerentiated
products mean that the wage-reducing eﬀect of international mergers
is larger, and more wage oriented unions imply that the scope for wage
reductions through international merger is also larger. In addition, more
wage oriented unions also means that a larger part of the synergy eﬀect
in a national merger is oﬀset by higher wages, which makes national
mergers relatively less attractive to the ﬁrms. On the other hand, a
higher outside wage implies that ﬁrms beneﬁtm o r ef r o mi n c r e a s e dl a bo u r
productivity, which means that the synergy eﬀect necessary for the ﬁrms
to prefer national mergers is smaller.
Once more, a complete analytical characterisation of the equilibrium
market structures is infeasible, so we resort to graphical illustrations.
22Since θ < 1










Figure 4: Equilibrium market structure with θ = 1












Figure 5: Equilibrium market structure with θ = 1
2 and w = 1
4.
Let us ﬁrst consider the case of rent-maximising unions. In Figures 4
and 5 we have illustrated the equilibrium outcome graphically in the
(b,a) plane, for two diﬀerent values of the outside wage. The solid lines
indicate the equilibrium market structures: if the synergy eﬀect is suf-
ﬁciently strong and products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated (Area A) the
equilibrium market structure is two national mergers, M2N.O n t h e
other hand, if products are very close substitutes (Area D) the EMS is
one international merger, MI. Otherwise (i.e. Areas B and C) the EMS
is two international mergers, M2I. We see that a higher outside wage in-
creases the scope for national mergers as the equilibrium outcome. Note
that the results from Proposition 2 are replicated for a =1 .
We have also indicated some implications for global welfare in Figures
4 and 5. In the absence of any synergy eﬀects (i.e., a =1 )w ek n o wf r o m
Proposition 3 that global welfare is always higher if the ﬁrms merge
internationally, rather than nationally. In this respect, there is a positive
21correspondence between private and social merger incentives. However,
this result may be overturned when national synergies are present. A
comparison of global welfare for the market structures M2N and M2I is
indicated by the dotted lines, where W (M2N) >W(M2I) to the North-
West of the dotted lines. An interesting feature of this variant of the
model is the presence of the Area B, where the ﬁrms have incentives
to merger internationally, but global welfare is higher if ﬁrms merge
nationally instead. This indicates that the presence of national merger
synergies could imply an increased conﬂict between private and social
merger incentives. The merged ﬁrm does not take fully into account the
synergy eﬀect, because the union responds by setting higher wages.
8.1 Unions’ merger preferences
Given that the owners are going to merge, will trade unions prefer the
ﬁrms to merge nationally or internationally? In the absence of national
merger synergies it is easily conﬁrmed that the unions always prefer ei-
ther no merger or national merger(s). In any case, national mergers
is always preferred to international ones. Thus, ﬁrms and unions have
conﬂicting interests with respect to the merger decisions. However, if
there are any exogenous synergy eﬀects associated with national merg-
ers, such mergers will cause an extra loss of employment for the unions,
which is detrimental to union utility if the unions are suﬃciently em-
ployment oriented. Because of this, there may be situations where the
unions would actually prefer the ﬁrms to merge internationally, rather
than nationally, even though international mergers reduces the unions’
power to capture oligopoly rents. This could be the case if the degree
of product diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently low, since international mergers
a r el e s se ﬀective as wage-reducing devices in this case.
An example of such a situation is illustrated in Figure 6, which indi-
cates the equilibrium market structure in the (θ,a) plane, for w = 1
5 and
b = 1
4.23 The solid line indicates the equilibrium market structures: if the
synergy eﬀect is suﬃciently high and unions are suﬃciently employment
oriented (Areas A and B) the EMS is two national mergers. Otherwise
(Areas C and D) the EMS is two international mergers. Union pref-
erences for national versus international mergers are indicated by the
dotted line, where Vi (M2I) >V i (M2N) to the left of the dotted line.
This establishes four diﬀerent regimes. The ﬁr m sa n dt h eu n i o n sh a v e
conﬂicting interests in Areas A and D: in the former regime the ﬁrms
want to merger nationally, whereas the unions would prefer them to
merge internationally instead. The opposite applies in the latter regime
23We change the presentation from (b,a) plane to (θ,a) plane because θ now is a












Figure 6: Equilibrium market structures with w = 1
5 and b = 1
4.
(Area D). On the other hand, the unions and the ﬁrms have coinciding
interests in Areas B and C: national mergers are preferred in the former
regime, whereas international mergers are preferred in the latter.
Perhaps Area A is especially interesting: we do not only have that
unions want to merge internationally rather than domestically, even
though this weakens their bargaining position. It might actually be
that they want this in situations where the ﬁr m st h e yw o r ki nw a n tt h e
opposite. Intuitively enough, the latter tends to happen for high values
of a and low values of θ, that is, when the increase in labour productivity
from a national merger is large - with the possibility of job losses being
correspondingly high - and when the union is employment oriented.
9S o m e c o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
I nt h i sp a p e rw eh a v ee x p l o r e dh o wt h ep r e s e n c eo ft r a d eu n i o np o w e r
can aﬀect the pattern of mergers in an international oligopoly. A core
idea is that a merger triggers wage changes. Our model can then be seen
as a merger model with endogenous costs. But in contrast to the received
literature, a merger may aﬀect costs for all ﬁrms in the industry.24 While
an international merger leads to lower wages for all ﬁrms, a national
merger has the opposite eﬀe c ta n dm a ye v e nl e a dt od i ﬀerent wages for
diﬀerent ﬁrms.
T h ef a c tt h a tam e r g e ra ﬀect wages for all ﬁrms in the industry
has important implications for merger policy. As argued in Farrell and
Shapiro (1990), a suﬃcient criterion for a merger to improve welfare is
that it leads to lower product prices. They propose a simple criterion for
24The ﬁrst study that introduced internal cost savings following a merger was Perry
and Porter (1985). A merger resulted in an internal change in how ﬁrms operated
their crucial assets. It triggered lower marginal costs, but only for the merged ﬁrm.
23when a merger results in lower product prices.25 It speciﬁes how large
the reduction in the merging ﬁrm’s marginal costs must be for consumer
prices to fall. If the merging ﬁrm lowers product prices, the non-merging
ﬁrm is expected to do the same. However, our results illustrate that
such a criterion can be misguided, because marginal costs change for the
non-merging ﬁrms as well. One cannot consider only the merging ﬁrm’s
pricing decision to tell whether consumers beneﬁt or not. For example,
with an international merger one could have that the merging ﬁrm sets a
higher output price while the non-merging ﬁrm sets a lower output price.
By using the Farrell and Shapiro criterion for that particular example
one would predict that all prices would go up, while the non-merging
ﬁrms’ prices would actually fall. In fact, non-merging ﬁrms may change
output prices even if the merging ﬁrm does not change its output prices.
According to our predictions, an international merger is expected to
lead to lower wages, while a national merger is expected to have the
opposite eﬀect on wages. It is an empirical question whether this in fact
happens. Unfortunately, there are no empirical studies that tests for
the wage eﬀect of an international versus a national merger. One recent
study, though, can shed some light on this issue. Gugler and Yurtoglu
(2003) test empirically how mergers aﬀect employment. They found
that in the UK a domestic merger reduces employment by much more
than cross border deals made by UK acquiring ﬁrms. This is consistent
with a prediction saying that national mergers are more wage-increasing
than cross-border mergers. However, one should be careful with the
interpretation of their results since their study is not tailored to test the
predictions from our theory.26 This calls for a more detailed empirical
study. The structure of the labour market should be taken into account
when testing directly for wage eﬀects following diﬀerent kinds of mergers.
This is an issue for future research.
25Farrell and Shapiro (1990) consider only an industry with identical products.
Werden (1996) extends their criterion to the case of an industry with diﬀerentiated
products.
26There are some potential problems relating their study to our predictions. First,
there are no direct link between employment eﬀects and wage changes. For example,
a cutback in employment can be a pure synergy eﬀect and will not necessarily mirror
a wage change. Second, in the empirical study there are no data to control for the
structure of the labour market. Third, when comparing national and international
mergers they do not distinguish between related and unrelated mergers. Only in the
former we expect that market power in the product market matters. Note also that
for Continental Europe they found only minor diﬀerences in the employment eﬀect
of national and international mergers.
24A Equilibrium employment, wages and proﬁts
A.1 No merger (M0)
Let ai =1for all i. The equilibrium outcome is given by
ni =
(1 − θ)(1− w)(2+b)
(2 + 3b)(2+b − 2θb)
, (A.1)
wi =





2 (1 − θ)
2 (1 − w)
2
(2 + 3b)
2 (2 + b − 2θb)
2 . (A.3)
A.2 One national merger (MN)
Consider a merger between owners 1 and 2. Let a1 = a2 = a and
a3 = a4 =1 . The equilibrium outcome is given by
n1 = n2 =
(1 − θ)(b +2 )β
2a2 (2 + 3b − b2)
³
2+3 b + b2 − 2θ
2b2
´, (A.4)




2+3 b + b2 − 2θ
2b2
´
(2 + 3b − b2)
, (A.5)
wA =
θa(2 + b +2 θb − b2)+w(1 − θ)(1+b)(2+b +2 θba)
2+3 b + b2 − 2θ
2b2 , (A.6)
wB =
θa(2 + b +2 θb − θb2)+w(1 − θ)(b +2 )( θb + ba + a)
a
³
2+3 b + b2 − 2θ
2b2
´ , (A.7)
π1 = π2 =
(2 + b)
2 (1 − θ)
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2, (A.8)
π3 = π4 =
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2, (A.9)
where
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25A.3 Two national mergers (M2N)
Let ai = a for all a. The equilibrium outcome is given by
ni =
(1 − θ)(a − w)(1+b)
2a2 (1 + b − θb)(1+2b)
, (A.10)
wi =





3 (1 − θ)
2 (a − w)
2
4a2 (1 + b − θb)
2 (1 + 2b)
2. (A.12)
A.4 One international merger (MI)
Consider a merger between ﬁrms 1 and 3. Let ai =1for all i.T h e
equilibrium outcome is given by
n1 = n3 =
(2 − b)(1− θ)(1− w)(8− 4b − 3b2 + b3)
2(2+3b − b2)(8− 4b − 10θb − 3b2 +1 0 θb2 + b3 − 2θb3)
,
(A.13)
n2 = n4 =
(1 − θ)(1− w)(8− 4b − 3b2 + b3)




θ(1 − b)(2− b)(4− b)+( 1− θ)w(8 − 4b − 3b2 + b3)
8 − 4b − 10θb − 3b2 +1 0 θb2 + b3 − 2θb3 , (A.15)
π1 = π3 =
(8 − 4b − 3b2 + b3)
2 (1 − θ)
2 (1 − w)
2 (1 + b)(2− b)
2
4(2+3b − b2)
2 (8 − 4b − 10θb − 3b2 +1 0 θb2 + b3 − 2θb3)
2,
(A.16)
π2 = π4 =
(8 − 4b − 3b2 + b3)
2 (1 − θ)
2 (1 − w)
2
(2 + 3b − b2)
2 (8 − 4b − 10θb − 3b2 +1 0 θb2 + b3 − 2θb3)
2.
(A.17)
A.5 Two international mergers (M2I)
Let ai =1for all i. The equilibrium outcome is given by
ni =









2 (1 + b)(1− θ)
2 (1 − w)
2
4(1+2b)
2 (2 + b − 3θb)
2 . (A.20)
26BP l a n t - s p e c i ﬁcw a g e s
What are the implications of allowing for the possibility of plant-speciﬁc
wages? Consider the case of rent-maximising unions with the following
utility functions:
VA =( w1 − w)n1 +( w2 − w)n2, (B.1)
VB =( w3 − w)n3 +( w4 − w)n4, (B.2)
where wi is the wage paid to workers at plant i.T h i s s p e c i ﬁcation
c o u l da l s op o r t r a yas i t u a t i o nw h e r eplant-speciﬁc unions cooperate in
wage setting within each country, but not across borders. Due to the
symmetry of the model, results will change only for market structures
with one international merger. Consider a merger between owners 1 and
3, i.e., MI. In this particular market structure, equilibrium wages and
proﬁts are given by
w1 = w3 =
4(1− b)(2− b)+w(8 − 3b2)
16 − 12b + b2 , (B.3)
w2 = w4 =
(4 − 3b)(2− b)+2 w(4 − b − b2)
16 − 12b + b2 , (B.4)
π1 = π3 =
(b +1 )( 8− b2)
2 (2 − b)
2 (1 − w)
2
4(2+3b − b2)
2 (16 − 12b + b2)
2 , (B.5)
π2 = π4 =
(4 − b)
2 (2 − b2)
2 (1 − w)
2
(2 + 3b − b2)
2 (16 − 12b + b2)
2. (B.6)
One international merger implies that the wage elasticity of plant-
speciﬁc labour demand diﬀer across plants. Each union will consequently
maximise total rents by setting a lower wage for the merged ﬁrm, i.e.
w1 <w 2. However, if we compare wages for other market structures it is
easily conﬁrmed that the wage responses to merger(s) are qualitatively
the same as before. Compared with the case of no merger, one interna-
tional merger will reduce wages at all plants, and more so for the plants
of the merged ﬁrm, whereas a second international merger will lead to a
further reduction in wages at all plants.
The equilibrium outcome of the full game is slightly modiﬁed, though.
A comparison of equilibrium proﬁts conﬁrms that two international
mergers now dominate all other market structures for every degree of
product diﬀerentiation. The reason is that a second international merger
always entails a larger wage saving gain when the unions are allowed to
set plant-speciﬁc wages. Consequently, a second international merger is
now proﬁtable even if products are (close to) homogenous.
27Implications for global welfare are also somewhat modiﬁed. By com-
paring global welfare across market structures it is straightforward to
check that two international mergers a r en o wt h es o c i a l l ym o s tp r e f e r r e d
market structure if b>0.56. The intuition is quite straightforward: with
plant-speciﬁc wages there is a larger overall wage reduction associated
with the second international merger, and this cost-saving eﬀect out-
weighs the dampening-of-competition eﬀect, leading to lower consumer
prices. Thus, allowing for plant-speciﬁc wages leads to a somewhat
stronger correspondence between private and social merger incentives.
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